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Abstract
Data privacy has emerged as an important issue as data-driven
deep learning has been an essential component of modern ma-
chine learning systems. For instance, there could be a poten-
tial privacy risk of machine learning systems via the model
inversion attack, whose goal is to reconstruct the input data
from the latent representation of deep networks. Our work
aims at learning a privacy-preserving and task-oriented rep-
resentation to defend against such model inversion attacks.
Specifically, we propose an adversarial reconstruction learn-
ing framework that prevents the latent representations de-
coded into original input data. By simulating the expected be-
havior of adversary, our framework is realized by minimizing
the negative pixel reconstruction loss or the negative feature
reconstruction (i.e., perceptual distance) loss. We validate the
proposed method on face attribute prediction, showing that
our method allows protecting visual privacy with a small de-
crease in utility performance. In addition, we show the utility-
privacy trade-off with different choices of hyperparameter for
negative perceptual distance loss at training, allowing service
providers to determine the right level of privacy-protection
with a certain utility performance. Moreover, we provide an
extensive study with different selections of features, tasks,
and the data to further analyze their influence on privacy pro-
tection.
Introduction
As machine learning (ML) algorithms powered by deep neu-
ral networks and large data have demonstrated an impressive
performance in many areas across natural language (Bah-
danau, Cho, and Bengio 2015; Wu et al. 2016), speech (Oord
et al. 2016) and computer vision (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and
Hinton 2012; He et al. 2016), there have been increased in-
terests in ML-as-a-service cloud services. These systems de-
mand frequent data transmissions between service providers
and their customers to train ML models, or users to evaluate
their data. For example, customers who want to develop face
recognition system may share the set of images containing
people of interest with cloud service providers (CSPs). Fa-
cial expression based recommendation system may ask users
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Figure 1: Representations of conventional deep learning al-
gorithms are vulnerable to adversary’s model inversion at-
tack (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015), which raise se-
rious issues on data privacy. Our method learns task-oriented
features while preventing private information being decoded
into an input space by simulating the adversary’s behavior at
training phase via negative reconstruction loss.
to upload photos. Unfortunately, these processes are exposed
to serious privacy risks. Data containing the confidential in-
formation shared from the customers can be misused by the
CSPs or acquired by the adversary. The damage is critical if
the raw data is shared with no encryption strategy.
An alternative solution to protect privacy is to encode
data using deep features. While these approaches are gen-
erally more secure than raw data, recent advances in model
inversion (MI) techniques (Mahendran and Vedaldi 2015;
Dosovitskiy and Brox 2016b; Zhang, Lee, and Lee 2016;
Dosovitskiy and Brox 2016a) call the security of deep fea-
tures into question. For example, (Dosovitskiy and Brox
2016a) shows that adding deep image prior (e.g., percep-
tual similarity) allows inversion from low-, mid-, as well as
high-level features.
In this work, we study how to learn a privacy-preserving
and task-oriented deep representation. We focus on the de-
fense against a black-box model inversion attack, where the
adversary is allowed to make unlimited inferences1 of their
1While our assumption is the most favorable scenario to adver-
sary, in practice, the CSPs can limit the number of inferences. MI
attack with limited inference is beyond the scope of this work.
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own data2 to recover input from acquired features of private
customer and user data. As an adversary, we consider an MI
attack based on the neural decoder that is trained to recon-
struct the data using data-feature pairs. Perceptual (Dosovit-
skiy and Brox 2016a) and GAN (Goodfellow et al. 2014)
losses are employed to improve the generation quality. Fi-
nally, we present our adversarial data reconstruction learn-
ing that involves an alternate training of encoder and de-
coder. While the decoder, simulating the adversary’s attack,
is trained to reconstruct input from the feature, the encoder
is trained to maximize the reconstruction error to prevent de-
coder from inverting features while minimizing the task loss.
We explain the vulnerability of deep networks against the
MI attacks in the context of facial attribute analysis with ex-
tensive experimental results. We show that it is difficult to
invert the adversarially learned features and thus the pro-
posed method successfully defends against a few strong in-
version attacks. In this work, we perform extensive exper-
iments by inverting from different CNN layers, with dif-
ferent data for adversary, with different utility tasks, with
different weight of loss term, to study their influences on
data privacy. Furthermore, we show the effectiveness of our
method against feature-level privacy attacks by demonstrat-
ing the improved invariance on the face identity, even when
the model is trained with no identity supervision.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We propose an adversarial data reconstruction learning to
defend against black-box model inversion attacks, along
with a few strong attack methods based on neural decoder.
• We demonstrate the vulnerability of standard deep fea-
tures and the effectiveness of the features learned with our
method in preventing data reconstruction.
• We show the utility-privacy trade-off with different choice
of hyperparameter for negative perceptual distance loss.
• We perform extensive study of the impacts on the privacy
protection with different layers of features, tasks, and data
for decoder training.
Related Work
Data Privacy Protection
To protect data privacy, numerous approaches have been
proposed based on information theory (Liang et al.
2009), statistics (du Pin Calmon and Fawaz 2012; Smith
2011), and learnability (Kasiviswanathan et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, syntactic anonymization methods including k-
anonymity (Sweeney 2002), l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et
al. 2006) and t-closeness (Li, Li, and Venkatasubramanian
2007) are developed. Nevertheless, these approaches pro-
tect sensitive attributes in a static database but do not scale
well to high-dimensional image data. On the other hand, the
concept of differential privacy (Dwork and Nissim 2004;
Dwork et al. 2006) has been introduced to provide formal
privacy guarantee. It prevents an adversary from gaining ad-
ditional knowledge by including or excluding an individual
2Although we assume the adversary has no direct access to the
private data used for model training, adversary’s own data is as-
sumed to be representative of them.
subject, but the information leaked from the released data
itself is not discussed in these works.
Visual Privacy Protection
Typical privacy-preserving visual recognition methods aim
to transform the image data such that identity cannot be vi-
sually determined, based on image operations such as Gaus-
sian blur (Oh et al. 2016), mean shift filtering (Winkler,
Erde´lyi, and Rinner 2014), down-scaling, identity obfus-
cation (Oh et al. 2016), and adversarial image perturba-
tion (Oh, Fritz, and Schiele 2017). Although effective in
protecting privacy, these methods have negative impact on
utility. To overcome this limitation, numerous algorithms
have been proposed to complete the utility task based on
transformed data. (Wang et al. 2016) design a method to
improve low-resolution recognition performance via feature
enhancement and domain adaptation. In (Ryoo et al. 2017),
it is demonstrated that reliable action recognition may be
achieved at low resolutions by learning appropriate down-
sampling transformations. Furthermore, trade-offs between
resolution and action recognition accuracy are discussed in
(Dai et al. 2015). Furthermore, (Oh, Fritz, and Schiele 2017)
propose an adversarial method to learn the image perturba-
tion so as to fool the face identity classifier, but the adversar-
ial perturbed images are visually exposing the identity pri-
vacy. Different from these methods, our method learns im-
age features so as to protect the privacy, which could also
maintain the utility performance to some extent.
Feature and Model Inversion
There has been a growing interest in stealing the function-
ality from the black-box classifier (Orekondy, Schiele, and
Fritz 2019) or inverting CNNs to better understand what is
learned in neural networks. (Mahendran and Vedaldi 2015)
introduce optimization-based inversion technique that al-
lows low- and mid-level CNN features to be inverted. (Doso-
vitskiy and Brox 2016b; Zhang, Lee, and Lee 2016) suggest
to invert via up-convolution neural network and demonstrate
improved network inversion from mid-level representations.
Nevertheless, this method is less effective in inverting high-
level features. More importantly, recent studies (Dosovit-
skiy and Brox 2016a) show that adding perceptual image
prior allows inversion from high-level representations pos-
sible, exposing a potential privacy issue by inverting deep
representations. However, our method prevents image rep-
resentations from being reconstructed to original images via
adversarial learning.
Trade-off between Privacy and Utility
Recently, several methods protect the utility performance
when the information required for the utility task is unrelated
to the private information. For example, (Wu et al. 2018;
Ren, Jae Lee, and Ryoo 2018) disguise original face im-
ages (privacy) without sacrificing the performance of action
recognition (utility), since the information being useful to
action recognition is independent of the face information.
However, there still remains a question of how to better pro-
tect the privacy when the information for the utility task is
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Figure 2: An overview of our privacy-preserving representation learning method with adversarial data reconstruction. As in (a),
decoder (Dec) is trained to reconstruct an input X from latent encoding Z = Enc(X) on public data X2. Then, as in (b), we
update Enc on private data X1 to generate Z that fools Dec, i.e., prevent reconstructing an input X by Dec, while achieving
utility prediction performance via the classifier f .
related to the private information. In (Pittaluga, Koppal, and
Chakrabarti 2018), an encoding function is learned via ad-
versarial learning to prevent the encoded features from mak-
ing predictions about the specific attributes. Differently, our
method does not require additional annotations for the pri-
vate attributes and instead resolves this issue via an adver-
sarial reconstruction framework.
Differences between Our method and Existing methods.
In contrast to prior work, our approach can 1) scale up to
high-dimensional image data compared with those methods
based on k-anonymity, `-diversity abd t-closeness that are
often applied to field-structured data (e.g., tabular data); 2)
learn image representations as the alternative of raw images
while soem approaches focus on removing private informa-
tion in raw images; 3) require no definition of private at-
tribute or entailment of additional annotations.
Proposed Algorithm
Before introducing our privacy-preserving feature learning
method, we discuss the privacy attack methods of the adver-
sary. We then describe the proposed privacy-preserving and
task-oriented representation learning.
Adversary: Learn to Invert
To design a proper defense mechanism, we first need to un-
derstand an adversary’s attack method. Specifically, we fo-
cus on the model inversion (MI) attack (Fredrikson, Jha, and
Ristenpart 2015), where the goal of the adversary is to in-
vert features back to an input. We further assume a black-
box attack, where the adversary has unlimited access to the
models inference (Enc), but not the model parameters. This
is extremely generous setting to the adversary since they can
create a large-scale paired database of input X ∈X2 and the
feature Z =Enc(X). Here, we use X2 to distinguish the ad-
versary’s own dataset from the private training dataset X1 of
CSPs or their customers.
Given a paired dataset {(X∈X2, Z)}, the adversary in-
verts the feature via a decoder Deca :Z → X , which is
trained to reconstruct the inputX from the featureZ by min-
imizing the reconstruction loss3:
Lap = E{(X∈X2,Z)}
[‖Xˆ −X‖2], (1)
where Xˆ =Deca(Z). Note that the above does not involve
backpropagation through an Enc. The inversion quality may
be improved with the GAN loss (Goodfellow et al. 2014):
Laadv = EZ
[
log
(
1−D(Xˆ))], (2)
where D is the discriminator, telling the generated images
from the real ones by maximizing the following loss:
LaD = E{(X∈X2,Z)}
[
log
(
1−D(X))+ log (D(Xˆ))]. (3)
We can further improve the inversion quality by minimizing
the perceptual distance (Dosovitskiy and Brox 2016a):
Laperc = E{(X∈X2,Z)}
[‖g(Deca(Z))− g(X)‖2], (4)
where we use the conv1 to conv5 layers of the VGG net-
work (Simonyan and Zisserman 2015) pre-trained on the Im-
ageNet for g. The overall training objective of an adversary
thus can be written as:{
min
Deca
Lap + µ1Laadv + µ2Laperc,
max
D
LaD. (5)
Protector: Learn “NOT” to Invert
Realizing the attack types, we are now ready to present the
training objective of privacy-preserving and task-oriented
representation. To learn a task-oriented representation, we
adopt an MLP classifier f that predicts the utility label Y
from Z by minimizing the utility loss:
Lu = E{(X∈X1,Y )}
[L(f(Z), Y )], (6)
3Optimization-based inversion attack (Mahendran and Vedaldi
2015) may be considered instead, but it is not feasible in the black-
box setting since the adversary has no access toEncs model param-
eters. Even in the white-box scenario, inversion by decoder may be
preferred as it is cheaper to compute.
Table 1: Results on facial attribute prediction. λ2, and µ2 are fixed to 0. We report the MCC averaged over 40 attributes as a
utility metric and face and feature similarities as privacy metrics. The Enc is trained using binary cross entropy (BCE) without
or with the proposed adversarial reconstruction loss. Rows with † (#5 and #6) train Deca with an extra data from MS-Celeb-1M,
while those with ‡ (#7 and #8) use an extra data to train both Enc and Deca. Different µ1’s in (4) are deployed for MI attack.
#9 and #10 consider Smiling attribute prediction for utility task and MCC is evaluated only for Smiling attribute.
ID Enc Deca Mean MCC ↑ Face Sim. ↓ Feature Sim. ↓ SSIM PSNR
1 λ1 = 0 µ1 = 0 0.641 0.551 0.835 0.231 13.738
2 λ1 > 0 µ1 = 0 0.612 0.515 0.574 0.221 13.423
3 λ1 = 0 µ1 > 0 0.641 0.585 0.835 0.240 14.065
4 λ1 > 0 µ1 > 0 0.612 0.513 0.574 0.277 13.803
With more data for training Deca (ID #5 and #6) and both Enc and Deca (ID #7 and #8)
5 λ1 = 0† µ1 = 0 0.641 0.594 0.864 0.250 14.132
6 λ1 > 0† µ1 = 0 0.612 0.541 0.633 0.222 13.703
7 λ1 = 0‡ µ1 = 0 0.651 0.579 0.834 0.263 14.432
8 λ1 > 0‡ µ1 = 0 0.630 0.550 0.591 0.231 13.334
Single (Smiling) attribute prediction. MCC for Smiling attribute is reported in the parenthesis.
9 λ1 = 0 µ1 > 0 0.001 (0.851) 0.460 0.494 0.204 13.214
10 λ1 > 0 µ1 > 0 0.044 (0.862) 0.424 0.489 0.189 12.958
where f(Z)= f(Enc(X)), Y is the ground-truth label for
utility, and L is the standard loss (e.g., cross-entropy) for
utility. Note that X1 is a private training data, which is not
accessible to the adversary.
To learn a privacy-preserving feature against the MI at-
tack, an Enc needs to output Z that cannot be reconstructed
into an input X by any decoder. Unfortunately, enumerating
all possible decoders is not feasible. Instead, we borrow the
idea from adversarial learning (Goodfellow et al. 2014). To
be more specific, the decoder (Dec) is trained to compete
against an Enc in a way that it learns to decode Z of the
current Enc into X by minimizing the reconstruction loss:
Lp = E{(X∈X1,Z)}
[‖Dec(Z)−X‖2]. (7)
In addition, one can improve the quality of reconstruction,
resulting in a stronger adversary, using perceptual distance
loss as in (4):
Lperc = E{(X∈X1,Z)}
[‖g(Dec(Z))− g(X)‖2]. (8)
On the other hand, an Enc aims to fool Dec by maximizing
the reconstruction loss or perceptual distance loss. Finally,
the overall training objective of a protector is:
min
Enc,f
Lu − λ1Lp − λ2Lperc, (9)
while the decoder Dec is updated by the same loss function
as Deca according to (5). Figure 2 shows the main modules
of our method. We adopt alternative update strategy for the
proposed learning framework. The Deca and D are updated
first on the public dataX2 according to (5) whiling fixing the
Enc and f , and Enc and f are updated on the private data
by (9) and so forth until convergence.
Experimental Results
We first introduce two types of privacy attack methods: the
black-box MI attack and feature-level attack, and two met-
rics: face similarity and feature similarity. Next, we show the
effectiveness of our method against privacy attacks in differ-
ent scenarios.
Dataset and Experimental Setup
We use the widely-used CelebA (Liu et al. 2015) and MS-
Celeb-1M (Guo et al. 2016) datasets for experiments. In
most experiments, we split the CelebA dataset into three
parts, X1 with 160k images, X2 with 40k images, and the
test set T with the rest. For ablation studies with different
data for adversaries, we provide extra data for X2 from the
MS-Celeb-1M dataset. We use the ResNet-50 model (He et
al. 2016) for feature representation and two fully connected
layers for latent classifier f . The Dec uses up-sampling lay-
ers to decode features to pixel images. We compare the pro-
posed adversarial feature learning method to the baseline
where Enc is trained to minimize the binary cross entropy
(BCE) for prediction for 40 binary facial attributes. More
details regarding the networks can be found in the supple-
mentary material.
Evaluation against Data Privacy Attacks
Adversary’s Attacks. Given an Enc, we evaluate the ro-
bustness of its feature by simulating the adversary’s attacks,
i.e., the black-box MI attack and the feature-level attack.
While the MI attack aims at reconstructing the input to re-
cover the holistic information, the feature-level attack aims
to recover predefined private attributes from the feature. In
other words, the adversary aims to learn a mapping function
M :Z → C to reconstruct the feature of private attribute
prediction network C (e.g., face verification network):
min
M
EX∈X2
[
‖M(Z)− C(X)‖2
]
. (10)
The privacy information is not well protected if one finds M
that successfully minimizes the loss in (10).
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Figure 3: Visualization of reconstructions by Deca under various Enc and Deca settings. λ2 and µ2 are fixed to 0. Examples in
the second row (λ1 > 0) are results using our negative reconstruction loss, which shares less similarities to the input than the
examples in the first row, where the negative reconstruction loss is not employed.
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Figure 4: Visualization of reconstructed images from latent representations. “w/o adv” represents reconstruction from conven-
tional latent representations, whereas “w/ adv” means reconstruction from our privacy-preserving representations. All points
can be categorized into 4 classes (i.e., each attribute has + or −) in different colors as illustrated above.
Utility Metric. We measure the attribute prediction perfor-
mance of f ◦ Enc on T . Due to the imbalanced label distri-
bution of the CelebA dataset, we use the Matthews correla-
tion coefficient (MCC) (Boughorbel, Jarray, and El-Anbari
2017) as the evaluation metric:
MCC =
(TP · TN− FP · FN)√
(TP+FP)(TP+FN)(TN+FP)(TN+FN)
,
where TP and FN stand for true positive and false negative,
respectively. The MCC value falls into a range of [−1,+1],
in which +1, 0, and−1 indicate the perfect, random, and the
worst predictions, respectively.
Privacy Metric. For the MI attack, we compare the recon-
struction Xˆ =Deca(Enc(X)) toX by visual inspection and
perceptual similarity. The face similarity between X and
Xˆ is computed by the cosine similarity of their deep fea-
tures, e.g., layer 3 of C. Here, we use identity as a private
attribute and an OpenFace face verification model (Amos,
Ludwiczuk, and Satyanarayanan 2016) forC. We also report
the SSIM and PSNR of the reconstructed images to evaluate
the realism. For the feature-level attack, we report the cosine
similarity of features between M(Z) and C(X).
Empirical Results and Performance Analysis
Baseline. In Table 1, we first present main results by fix-
ing µ2 and λ2 equal to 0. The baseline model trained only
with the binary cross entropy (ID #1, #3) of 40 attributes are
compared with our model trained with negative reconstruc-
tion loss, i.e., λ1 = 1 (ID #2, #4). We simulate the weak
and strong adversaries without (µ1=0) or with (µ1> 0) the
GAN loss for training Deca. The proposed model maintains
a reasonable task performance with a decrease in face simi-
larity and feature similarity (#1 vs #2, #3 vs #4 in Table 1).
Such improved privacy protection is also shown in face or
feature similarities and visual inspection (Figure 3).
More Data. We validate the proposed model by adding
more data (10k images from MS-Celeb-1M) to X2 (#5 and
#6) to train Deca. While extra data similar to the data distri-
bution of X1 helps the adversary to improve Deca, as shown
from the face similarity comparisons between #1 and #5
(0.851 to 0.865), the Enc trained with our method is still
more robust to the MI attack. Furthermore, providing the
same amount of data for Enc training (#7 and #8) improves
the MCC slightly, while both face similarity and feature sim-
ilarity decrease more. This demonstrates that more data for
the Enc training will help protect the privacy. The reason is
more data would help better simulate a strong fake adver-
sary during the training stage, such that the Enc can learn to
encode images into more secure features.
Single Attribute. We consider a single attribute prediction.
Compared to 40 attributes prediction, the network needs
to maintain much less amount of information for a single
attribute prediction, and thus it should be easier to make
input 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Figure 5: Visualization of input and reconstructed images with different λ2 (shown on top of each column of images). Other
hyperparameters are fixed: λ1=1, µ1=0, µ2=1.
Table 2: Results with different λ2 in the training stage. Other
hyperparameters are fixed: λ1=1, µ1=0, µ2=1.
λ2 MCC ↑ Face Sim. ↓ Feat. Sim. ↓ SSIM PSNR
0 0.631 0.631 0.862 0.300 15.445
1 0.582 0.575 0.710 0.299 15.371
2 0.455 0.545 0.604 0.273 14.920
3 0.417 0.528 0.568 0.248 14.454
4 0.311 0.507 0.542 0.225 14.048
5 0.255 0.502 0.530 0.224 14.047
10 0.000 0.294 0.374 0.158 12.899
features privacy-protected. For example, the baseline Enc
trained for a single attribute prediction (#9) has significantly
lower face and feature similarities compared to that trained
for 40 attributes prediction (#1). Our method (#10) further
improves the privacy-protection thanks to the proposed neg-
ative reconstruction loss. As shown in the rightmost column
of Figure 3, the reconstructed images look like the mean
faces reflecting only the smiling attribute, as the information
of all other attributes is automatically discarded.
Visualization of Latent Representations
We visualize the learned features using t-SNE (Maaten and
Hinton 2008) to analyze the effectiveness of the proposed
method. Figure 4 shows the t-SNE plots for two scenar-
ios, either trained for 40 attribute prediction tasks or a sin-
gle (Smiling) attribute prediction task. For presentation clar-
ity, we colorcode data points with respect to two attributes,
namely, Eyeglasses and Smiling.
The baseline model features are well separable along both
attributes when trained for 40 attributes. On the other hand,
the features of the model trained with adversarial reconstruc-
tion loss are more uniformly distributed along these two at-
tributes since the encoder is forced to discard the private in-
formation relevant to the reconstruction as much as possible.
For the single attribute case, only the Smiling attribute is
preserved for both models. The red and blue dots are mixed
in the right side of Figure 4, which indicates the attribute
Eyeglasses is recognizable or separable. That is because the
attribute Eyeglasses is not the target training utility. The ad-
versarial reconstruction loss does not turn out to be partic-
ularly effective since the retained information in the feature
space is already minimal but sufficient for a single attribute
prediction and adding an extra loss to interfere the recon-
struction does not have a large benefit. This also corresponds
to the last columns of Figure 3, where the reconstructed im-
ages are almost mean faces with only smiling attributes pre-
served.
Ablation Study of Perceptual Distance Loss
We analyze the influence of the perceptual distance loss on
the privacy preserving mechanism. To pinpoint its impact,
we perform experiments by changing λ2, which corresponds
to the weight of the perceptual distance term in (8), while
fixing other hyperparameters for Enc (λ1=1) and Deca
(µ1=0, µ2=1). All utility and privacy metrics are reported
in Table 2 and the reconstructed images are presented in Fig-
ure 5.
Changing λ2 clearly demonstrates the trade-off between
utility and privacy. As we increase λ2, the model becomes
more privacy-protecting as demonstrated by the lower face
and feature similarities, but this comes at the cost of de-
creased utility performance (mean MCC). Our quantitative
analysis is also consistent with the visual results, where the
reconstructed images in Figure 5 contain less sensitive infor-
mation as λ2 increases and tend to be a mean face when λ2
becomes as high as 10. The trade-off between utility and pri-
vacy suggests that we can achieve different level of privacy
in real applications.
Ablation Study of Different Layers
As in (Dosovitskiy and Brox 2016b; 2016a), the MI attack
becomes much easier when low- or mid-level features are
used for inversion. We analyze the effect of features from
different layers on the utility and privacy. We choose six dif-
ferent layers of intermediate features in Enc, and adapt the
network structures of Dec and f accordingly. Specifically,
Enc and Dec are symmetric to each other, and f ◦Enc is the
entire ResNet-50 architecture followed by 2 fully connected
layers at all cases.
We first compare the face similarity and MCC in Table 3.
The face similarity decreases as the layer goes deeper for the
baseline model because the information becomes abstract
during the forwarding process. With adversarial training, the
face similarity are reduced compared to those without adver-
sarial training, while the MCC is not affected significantly.
Furthermore, the face similarity with adversarial training in
Table 3: Evaluation on different layers. We show that our method “w/ adv” maintains a good mean MCC while reducing the
face similarity to protect the privacy, consistently improving across all feature layers compared to “w/o adv”. Furthermore, our
method shows smaller LDA scores, which indicate that the relative distance among the features of different identities becomes
smaller, hence benefiting privacy preservation.
Conv1 Conv2 Conv3 Conv4 Avg Pool FC Layer
w/o adv w/ adv w/o adv w/ adv w/o adv w/ adv w/o adv w/ adv w/o adv w/ adv w/o adv w/ adv
Face Sim. ↓ 0.98 0.36 0.95 0.48 0.74 0.49 0.64 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.51
Mean MCC ↑ 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.61
Within Var (Sw) 1468.77 768.29 1543.09 1523.31 2067.54 1779.75 2212.66 2155.19 2209.97 2243.49 2541.02 1061.99
Between Var (Sb) 2884.42 218.88 2726.15 597.48 1608.97 598.39 1199.69 747.37 1155.09 935.16 983.14 710.93
LDA Score ↓ 1.96 0.28 1.77 0.39 0.78 0.34 0.54 0.35 0.52 0.42 2.58 1.49
lower layers is generally lower than that in deeper layers.
Next, we present within-class variance Sw, between-class
variance Sb and the LDA score Sb/Sw. A low LDA score
indicates that the relative distance among the features of
different identities is small, thus more privacy-preserving,
whereas the distance between two features of the same iden-
tity becomes large. As shown in Table 3, the LDA score of
baseline model decreases as the layer goes deeper. In addi-
tion, the LDA score of our model is generally smaller than
that of the baseline, which further validates that the features
with adversarial training are more uniformly distributed.
Relation to Information Bottleneck
While our method is developed by integrating potential at-
tacks from adversary (e.g., decoding latent representation
into the pixel space), our method can be understood from
the information-theoretic perspective. The objective func-
tion can be mathematically formalized using mutual infor-
mation and conditional entropy:
min
Enc,f
max
Dec
I(Dec(Z);X) +H(Y |f(Z)), (11)
where Z =Enc(X). Note that our objective resembles that
of information bottleneck methods (Tishby, Pereira, and
Bialek 2000; Achille and Soatto 2018; Alemi et al. 2017)
except that we introduce the decoder to estimate mutual in-
formation via a min-max game between Enc and Dec (Bel-
ghazi et al. 2018). The mutual information term can be re-
duced as:
I(Dec(Z);X)=H(X)−H(X|Dec(Z)). (12)
Since H(X) is a constant, the protector’s objective is:
min
Enc,f
max
Dec
−H(X|Dec(Z)) +H(Y |f(Z)). (13)
If we use the reconstruction error for the first term:
H(X|Dec(Z)) = E{(X,Z)}
[‖Dec(Z)−X‖2], (14)
(13) is realized as a minimization of negative reconstruction
loss for updating Enc. If we use reconstruction error and
perceptual error for the first term:
H(X|Dec(Z)) = λ1E{(X,Z)}
[‖Dec(Z)−X‖2
+ λ2‖g(Dec(Z))− g(X)‖2
]
, (15)
(13) is realized as a minimization of negative reconstruction
loss and negative perceptual loss for updating Enc as in (9).
Aside from empirical results, the information-theoretic
perspective of our method also reveals some limitations of
the current approach. First, maximizingH(X|Dec(Z)) may
not directly provide privacy-preservation to latent represen-
tations, which is evident from the data-processing inequal-
ity H(X|Dec(Z))≥H(X|Z). To protect privacy against
universal attacks, it is necessary to develop methods to
maximize H(X|Z). Furthermore, our algorithm can defend
against data reconstruction adversary, but there might be
useful private information remaining that adversaries can
take advantage of, such as the face ethnicity information
from the skin color of reconstructed images, even though
the reconstructed images are not recognized the same as the
input images. However, the proposed method provides an ef-
fective method to protecting against private attributes, which
is of great interest towards learning explainable representa-
tions in the future.
Conclusions
We propose an adversarial learning framework to learn a la-
tent representation that preserves visual data privacy. Our
method is developed by simulating the adversary’s expected
behavior for the model inversion attack and is realized by
alternating update of Enc and Dec networks. We introduce
quantitative evaluation methods and provide comprehensive
analysis of our adversarial learning method. Experimental
results demonstrate that our algorithm can learn privacy-
preserving and task-oriented representations.
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Appendix
Network Architectures
The encoder is set to be the standard ResNet-50 architecture.
We refer an official implementation for a detailed reference4.
Unless otherwise stated, we extract the feature for Enc from
the fc layer. The architecture of the decoder is almost re-
verse to the Enc with up-sampling, as shown in Figure 6.
In the ablation study with different layers of features, we
choose six different layers of ResNet-50. The architectures
of Dec and latent classifier f change accordingly. For in-
stance, if we choose layer3 as the intermediate layer, then
the decoder should start from layer3 to layer1 and the
latent classifier should start from layer4 to fc with two
additional fully connected layers followed.
Visualization with Perceptual Distance Loss
In Figure 7, we visualize additional results for reconstruc-
tion to demonstrate the trade-off between utility and privacy
by changing the regularization coefficient of perceptual dis-
tance loss λ2 while fixing other hyperparameters for Enc
(λ1 = 1) and Deca (µ1 = 0, µ2 = 1).
4https://github.com/pytorch/vision/blob/master/torchvision/
models/resnet.py
fc
linear: (1000, 2048) 
Relu
avgpool
linear: (2048, 2048*7*7)
activation: Relu
layer5 
deconv: (2048, 1024,  3x3)
BN + Relu
layer4 
deconv: (1024, 512,  3x3)
BN + Relu
layer3 
deconv: (512, 256,  3x3)
BN + Relu
layer2 
deconv: (256, 64, 3x3)
BN + Relu
layer1 
deconv: (64,  3, 3x3)
Tanh
Figure 6: Dec and Deca network architectures.
input 0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Figure 7: Reconstructed images with different λ2 (shown on top of each image) by fixing λ1=1, and µ1=0, µ2=1.
